Com base no ESEB 2002 e no LAPOP 2007, o artigo analisa a evolução das bases do apoio de massa ao Partido dos Trabalhadores desde que Lula chegou ao poder em 2002. Historicamente, só o PT tem sido capaz de construir e manter uma ampla base de "identificados" com o partido entre os eleitores brasileiros. Mas, desde 2002, o PT tornou-se mais moderado e muito menos preocupado com os princípios ideológicos e partidários de seus anos iniciais e o artigo investiga o impacto da moderação da liderança do PT sobre os petistas. Os resultados sugerem que houve poucas mudanças nas bases do petismo: uma leve moderação e uma pequena mudança no perfil socioeconômico. Indicam também que o sentimento com relação à corrupção permanece sem importância como determinante do petismo.

On the bases of ESEB 2002 and in LAPOP 2007, the article analyzes the evolution of the bases of the support of mass to the PT since Lula took office in 2002. Historically, only the PT has been able to build and maintain a fairly large base of partisan "identifiers" among Brazilian voters. But, since 2002, the PT became more moderate and far less concerned with ideology and with the principles the party laid out in its early years and the article investigates the impact of the moderation of the PT's leadership on the "petistas". The results suggest that it had few changes in the bases of "petismo": a slight moderation and a small change in socioeconomic profile. They also indicate that the sentiment about corruption remains unimportant as a determinant of "petismo".

A partir dos dados do ESEB de 2002 o autor realiza um estudo das bases eleitorais do PT e de hipóteses sobre a natureza do petismo. Através de técnicas estatísticas multivariadas, são testadas relações do petismo com variáveis demográficas, socioeconômicas e variáveis relativas a questões políticas específicas. Os resultados apontam que apenas a escolaridade tem uma associação específica com o petismo, com implicações para o seu comportamento sócio-político.

Based on the results of the 2002 Brazilian Electoral Study, the author analyses the electoral bases of the Worker´s Party and the factors associated with the "petismo". The relationships between the "petismo"and the socioeconomic, demographic and political variables are tested using multivariate analysis. The results indicate that the only "social category"associated with "petismo"is level of education, and it has clear implications to their social and political behavior.

This article examines the successes and limits of the macroeconomic and fiscal reforms under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Administration in Brazil. The author begins by studying factors that contributed to macroeconomic difficulties prior to 1995, then proceeds to examine how the Real Plan enabled the Cardoso Administration to control interference by State Governors in the national economy. The article then describes how former President Cardoso's policies generated the current ''fiscal straitjacket'' in Brazil, and concludes by discussing how the Cardoso government's legacy may continue to constrain action by future Brazilian Administrations.

Dans cet article, on examine les succès et les limites des réformes macroéconomiques et fiscales du gouvernement sous la présidence de Fernando Henrique Cardoso. On analyse d'abord les facteurs responsables des difficultés macroéconomiques avant 1995, ainsi que la façon dont le Plan Real a permis au gouvernement FHC de contrôler l'ingérence des exécutifs régionaux dans l'économie nationale. Ensuite on voit comment les politiques de président ont créé le ''carcan fiscal'' où se trouve actuellement le Brésil et montre que la gestion écoulée pourra restreindre l'action des gouvernements brésiliens à venir.

Este artigo analisa o incremento do poder dos governadores e o ressurgimento dos interesses políticos estaduais como determinantes do comportamento dos congressistas durante a transição democrática. Para isso, os autores explicam como os governos militares fracassaram em reduzir a influência das redes políticas estaduais sobre a classe política e como os governadores remergiram e tornaram-se atores fundamentais para derrubar o regime autoritário. Por fim, fornecem exemplos de como os interesses estaduais e os governadores tiveram papel-chave durante a transição e ainda continuam a tê-lo na política brasileira contemporânea.

This article analyzes the increase in the power of state governors and the resurgence of the state-based interests of the members of the National Congress during Brazil's transition to democracy. The 1964-85 military regime's failure to reduce the influence of state-based interests and the reemergence of the state governors as powerful political actors in Brazil are explained. Examples are provided of how state interests and state governors have influenced the transition process and continue to play key roles in contemporary Brazilian politics.

A prominent question in recent comparative work is "when will the personal vote matter?" Typically, scholars approach this question at a cross-national as opposed to a cross-party level: that is, they highlight features of national electoral systems that create incentives for individual politicians to pursue a personal (or a party) vote, rather than highlighting features of parties that might predispose candidates in those parties to pursue personal (or party) votes. Implicitly, the electoral-systems comparisons hold constant party features. In this paper, in contrast, I focus on the characteristics of parties, as opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of personal vote seeking. I argue that adoption of an individualistic or collective strategy depends largely on a party’s access to and control over funding and patronage: generally, parties with good access to money and pork should adopt individualistic strategies, while parties with poor access to money and pork should adopt more collective strategies. In this paper, I explore the Brazilian case to test this claim. I test my claims at the national and district level, using multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, I explain how one party, the Workers’ Party (PT), has overcome the incentives of the electoral system over the long run

Facteurs Déterminants du Vote pour un Parti dans des Systèmes Électoraux Axés sur le Candidat: Évidence du Brésil Une importante question soulevée par les études électorales contemporaines consiste à reconnaître quand le vote pour la personne du candidat a une influence. En général cette question est traitée sous forme de recherches au niveau national et non par une analyse comparant les partis entre eux, ou plutôt, on souligne habituellement les aspects des systèmes électoraux nationaux poussant les politiciens à rechercher des voix pour eux-mêmes en tant que personnes (ou pour le parti), au lieu de distinguer les caractéristiques des partis qui pourraient prédisposer leurs candidats à se procurer ces voix. Les comparaisons entre systèmes électoraux supposent constantes les caractéristiques des partis. L’analyse est ici concentrée sur celles-ci en les opposant à celles des systèmes électoraux pris comme facteurs déterminants de la quête du vote sur la personne du candidat. On y affirme que l’adoption d’une stratégie individualiste ou collectiviste dépend en grande part de la capacité du parti à contrôler et à avoir accès au financement, ainsi qu’au soutien gouvernemental; de façon générale, les partis qui ont un bon accès à ces ressources optent pour des stratégies individualistes, alors que les partis qui ne disposent pas de ce même accès se tournent vers des stratégies plus collectivistes. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, on examine le cas brésilien par l’étude des résultats électoraux au niveau du pays et des états en nous servant d’une analyse à régression multiple. En outre, on explique comment un parti déterminé, le Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a réussi à résister au long du temps aux incitations provenant du système électoral